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CEO Compensation and  
Concurrent Executive Employment of  
Outside Directors:  
A Panel Data Analysis of S&P 1500 firms 
By YOUNG-CHUL KIM AND SUJIN SONG* 
In many advanced countries, most outside directors are executives, 
active or retired, at other firms; in other words, executives from other 
companies make executive compensation decisions. This situation may 
hinder the board of directors (BOD) in their efforts to optimize 
executive compensation levels objectively. Using a panel data analysis 
of the S&P 1500 companies, we provide supplemental evidence of 
whether, and to what extent, the concurrent executive employment of 
outside directors distorts the executive pay decisions at a given 
company. An unbiased fixed-effect estimation confirms that a $1.00 
increase in CEO pay at outside directors’ primary companies results 
in an approximate increase of $0.22 in CEO pay at the given company. 
From a policy perspective, this added agency problem — caused by 
the BOD and not by management — is noted as difficult to control; 
although a firm may establish board independence, the inherent 
concurrent employment of directors on a board continues to exist. 
Key Word: CEO Compensation, Director-Agency Problem, 
Outside Directors, Board of Directors,  
Corporate Governance 
JEL Code: M12, G34, G38 
 
 
  I. Introduction 
 
xecutive compensation has attracted significant attention from economists and 
business experts since the early 1990s. News stories have questioned the 
fairness of executive pay practices and articles have been published about 
inappropriate pay practices, spurring pressure for oversight and regulation  
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(e.g., Boyd 1994; Hall and Murphy 2003; Jensen et al. 2004). As delegates of 
shareholders, board members are entitled to monitor and control managers to 
minimize agency costs. However, boards of directors (BOD) have not been very 
effective, partly because they have been captured by chief executive officers (CEO) 
and because of the directors’ own agency problem; just as no reason exists to 
presume that managers automatically seek to maximize shareholder value, no 
reason exists to expect a priori that directors will also do so. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) refer to this phenomenon as the director–agency problem. 
For instance, most outside directors have no significant vested interest in the 
firm and, therefore, need not be very careful when deciding on company 
expenditure amounts, including executive pay (Baker et al. 1988; Cyert et al. 2002; 
and Brenner and Schwalbach 2009). Furthermore, they may not want to hurt their 
personal or business relationships over stingy decisions about compensation. If 
outside directors are appointed owing to personal ties, they may even fear losing 
their board seats. 
Additionally, it is noteworthy that most outside directors are executives, active 
or retired, at other firms in the United States and in many other advanced countries, 
including the United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands. In other words, 
executives from other companies make executive compensation decisions in those 
countries. This situation may significantly affect the executive compensation 
decision-making process. That is, directors’ status as executives at other firms can 
be another source of the director–agency problem. 
Numerous governance experts describe their concerns about this additional 
agency problem. For example, Jensen et al. (2004) recommend that boards limit 
the number of CEO-directors who are outside directors but serve as CEOs for other 
firms, as such outside directors tend to “subconsciously (if not consciously) view 
the board through the eyes of a CEO.”1 However, solid empirical support of their 
concerns is relatively rare, except for much of the “social network” literature that 
examines the influence of connections between board members and executives on 
the level of CEO compensation (e.g., Hwang and Kim 2009; Bizjak et al. 2009; 
Larcker et al. 2005; and Hallock 1997).  
In contrast, business practitioners often claim that this concern could be 
imaginary and that their policy suggestions would cause over-regulation of BOD 
operations. Instead, they emphasize that having other top executives as directors on 
the board provides the BOD with numerous advantages related to its evaluation of 
business strategies, voting on major operational proposals, and the scrutinizing of 
financial and accounting reports. Their claims are partly supported by positive 
stock price reactions to director appointments when the appointee is an active CEO 
(Fich 2005). 
The empirical work in this paper provides supplemental evidence of whether, 
and to what extent, the concurrent executive employment of outside directors 
distorts pay decisions at a given company. We collected a consecutive two-year 
compensation dataset of the S&P 1500 firms from Compustat Execomp. Using the 
Board Analyst database, each company listed in the S&P 1500 was matched to its 
 
1Faleye (2011) argues that CEO-directors may overestimate the effort and skill requirements of the executive 
job and rationalize higher compensation packages for top executives. 
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outside directors’ primary companies for which they serve (or served) as 
executives. We then calculated the average CEO pay of matched outside directors’ 
primary companies. Based on this constructed sample, we tested whether the 
average level of CEO pay at directors’ primary companies affects the level of CEO 
pay at a given company. If this finding is insignificant, we may not be able to state 
that the characteristics of outside directors’ primary companies directly distort the 
executive pay decisions at a given company.  
In our analysis, the test result was statistically significant. Using the fixed effects 
model with a panel data analysis, which is identical to the first-difference model in 
the given consecutive two-year sample, we observe a strong link between CEO pay 
at outside directors’ primary companies and CEO pay at a given company; a $1.00 
increase in CEO pay at outside directors’ primary companies leads to an 
approximate $0.22 increase in CEO pay at a given firm. We also observe that a 1% 
increase in CEO pay at outside directors’ primary companies is associated with a 
0.13% increase in CEO pay at a given firm.  
We obtained these test outcomes even after controlling for the size (and the 
entrenchment) associations between outside directors’ primary companies and each 
given company. Taking all of the interlocking cross-directorship observations out 
of the samples made little difference in the test outcomes. The observed strong link 
may be generated by several other sources. For instance, the positive association 
between CEO pay levels is well supported by a psychological phenomenon known 
as the anchoring effect (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), which holds that outside 
directors may use the CEO pay levels at their primary companies as firsthand 
reference points when making CEO pay decisions at a given firm. It is also 
plausible that the homogeneity and cohesiveness of top executives, termed the 
inner circle, may affect the observed positive association between CEO pay levels. 
Our empirical findings are noteworthy from a policy perspective because the 
additional agency problem within the supposedly “independent” BOD is difficult to 
control; despite the fact that we establish board independence through various 
imposed regulations and shareholder activism, this inherent characteristic of 
concurrent employment among board members continues to exist in the corporate 
governance systems of many advanced countries, unless the government imposes 
direct regulations on the board structure.  
The paper is organized into the following sections. Section II describes the data 
sources and the procedure used to construct the dataset. Section III covers the 
methodologies used in the analysis. Section IV presents the test results. Section V 
discusses the implications of the findings, and Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
II. Dataset and Variables 
 
In this section, we describe the data sources and the process of constructing the 
dataset and explain the key variables used in the analysis. The Compustat Execomp 
(also known as ExecuComp) and Board Analyst databases were used as sources of 
the board and ownership characteristics and the economic information pertaining to 
the selected firms. Compustat Execomp, which began in 1994, provides data on 
compensation for the top five executives and basic economic performance metrics, 
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primarily for S&P 1500 companies. Board Analyst, which began in 2001, is a 
source of comprehensive, objective corporate governance and compensation 
information for more than 10,000 U.S. companies. 
 
A. Sample and Datasets 
 
The research in this paper covers the early 2000s because we use the first 
samples that the Board Analyst started to provide. More specifically, we 
constructed a dataset that contains two-year panel data (2002 and 2003) on 556 
firm entries from the S&P 1500.2 The most challenging aspect when constructing 
the datasets was to “match” the original company and the directors’ primary 
company information. For each selected firm entry, background company 
information for at least two outside directors was entered successfully.  
In detail, the 556 firm entries in the final sample were selected using the 
following procedure. First, we started with firm entries from the S&P 1500 in 2002 
and 2003, after which we collected each firm’s director information from 
“Directorships in Board Analyst” database, which included the names of the 
directors and their primary companies.  
Second, CEO compensation and certain types of economic information for each 
firm were taken from “2002 and 2003 Compustat Execomp” database. 
Third, to obtain CEO compensation information at the directors’ primary 
companies, we matched the outside directors’ primary companies against the “2002 
and 2003 Compustat Execomp” database. Note that tiresome and time-consuming 
“hand matching” is required during this process because the names of the directors’ 
primary companies contained in Board Analyst are displayed in a casual manner, 
whereas Compustat Execomp provides the companies’ official names. Moreover, 
only outside directors’ primary companies that are listed (or formerly listed) in the 
S&P 1500 index can be matched, as Compustat Execomp provides information 
exclusively on S&P 1500 companies. 
Fourth, using the match success result, we selected firms that show at least two 
match successes (firms matched with at least two directors’ primary companies).  
Fifth, to control for the industry effect, we needed at least eight firm entries for 
each industry group identified using the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) code. Thus, we eliminated firm entries with fewer than eight companies in 
the same industry group. 
According to these criteria, 556 firm entries in total qualified for the test.3 
Larger firms are easier to match to their directors’ primary companies listed in the 
S&P 1500. Thus, we find that most of the selected firms in the final sample are in 
the S&P 500. The match ratio is 2.78, indicating that each firm entry is matched to 
approximately three director companies.4 The two-digit SIC code classification 
 
2The empirical findings in this paper could be verified more concretely using a panel dataset that reflects 
extended periods. 
3Samples with excessive CEO pay could hinder the determination of the general business-sector trend. Thus, 
we removed outliers reflecting more than $40 million in CEO compensation, either for each given firm or as the 
average CEO compensation of directors’ primary companies. 
4In detail, 301 firm entries have 2 matched director companies; 129 firm entries have 3; 88 firm entries have 
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shows that the sample contains 15 different industries. 
  
B. Variables 
 
The dependent variable is CEO pay, which is the CEO’s total compensation, 
including their salary, bonus, restricted stock grants, stock options, and other 
benefits. The variable of primary interest is director company CEO pay, which 
represents the average CEO pay in the matched directors’ primary companies.  
Table 1 (Variable Definitions) and Table 2 (Summary Statistics) describe all of 
the control variables used in the test. Below, we define the key control variables 
and explain the correlation of these variables with the dependent variable, CEO 
pay.  
The following eleven board and ownership characteristics were collected for the 
test: independent directors, chairman CEO, compensation chair appointment, 
director appointment by CEO, busy directors, aged directors, board size, insider 
ownership, institutional ownership majority, entrenchment index, and CEO tenure.  
The first four variables represent the degree of board independence: independent 
directors, chairman CEO, compensation chair appointment, and director 
appointment by CEO.5 The next three variables indicate the degree of board 
effectiveness: busy directors, aged directors, and board size.6 Boards that are more 
independent and more effective are expected to be negatively correlated with the 
level of CEO pay (Core et al. 1999). 
The next two variables, insider ownership and institutional ownership majority, 
represent the ownership structure. Insider ownership is the expected percentage of 
shares held by top management and directors. Institutional ownership majority 
indicates whether a majority of outstanding shares are held by institutions. Larger 
insider ownership levels result in fewer agency problems and are thus expected to 
be negatively correlated with the level of CEO pay (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Institutions are expected to participate more actively in corporate governance 
issues. Thus, majority ownership by institutional investors may prevent excessive 
CEO pay. 
To reflect the overall entrenchment of the management team, we use the 
entrenchment index of Bebchuck et al. (2009), which is composed of four 
“constitutional” provisions, including a supermajority requirement for mergers and 
a staggered board, along with two “takeover readiness” provisions, specifically 
poison pills and severance agreements. Stronger entrenchment may imply a weaker 
governance structure and thus may result in higher CEO pay.  
Finally, CEO tenure is expected to be negatively correlated with CEO pay. 
Jensen et al. (2004) argue that the BOD almost invariably pays “too much” for    
                                                                                                         
4; 26 firm entries have 5; 6 firm entries have 6; 4 firm entries have 7; and 2 firm entries have 8. 
5Compensation chair appointment indicates whether the chairman of the compensation committee was 
appointed by the current CEO. Director appointment by CEO is the ratio of outside directors appointed by the 
current CEO. 
6Busy directors refers to the ratio of directors who serve on more than four boards. Aged directors is the ratio 
of directors who are older than 70 years old. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
22 KDI Journal of Economic Policy AUGUST 2016 
TABLE 1—VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Table 1 presents definitions of the variables used in this paper. [CE] indicates that the data source is 
Compustat Execomp and [BA] indicates that the data source is Board Analyst.  
Variables Definitions [Source]
Key Variables 
CEO Pay Total compensation for the firm’s CEO, including the following: salary, 
bonus, restricted stock granted, stock options granted. [CE]  
Director Company CEO Pay Average total compensation rewarded to CEOs of all matched companies, 
in which the outside directors work as executives. [collected manually, CE] 
Ratio of CEO-Directors Ratio of CEO-directors to the total number of outside directors. CEO-
director is defined as an outside director who is a CEO in his/her primary 
company. [collected manually, BA] 
Director Company Variables 
Director Company Market Cap Average market cap of all matched companies, in which the outside 
directors work as executives. [collected manually, CE] 
Director Company Entrenchment Average entrenchment index of all matched companies, in which the 
outside directors work as executives. [collected manually, Lucian 
Bebchuk’s Web] 
Board and Ownership Characteristics 
Independent Directors Ratio of the number of independent outside directors to the total number of 
outside directors. [BA] 
Busy Directors Ratio of the number of directors who are on more than four boards to the 
total number of outside directors. [BA] 
Aged Directors Ratio of the number of directors who are older than 70 years to the total 
number of outside directors. [BA] 
Insider Ownership Estimated percentage of shares held by top management and directors, as 
reported in the company’s most recent proxy statement. [BA] 
Chairman CEO Indicates whether the current CEO is also the current chairman of the 
board. [BA] 
Board Size Total number of directors on the board. [BA] 
CEO Tenure Number of years of service of the current CEO. [BA] 
Institution Ownership Majority Indicates whether a majority of outstanding shares are held by institutions. 
[BA] 
Compensation Chair Appointment Indicates whether the chairman of the compensation committee was 
appointed by the current CEO. [collected manually] 
Director Appointment by CEO Ratio of the number of outside directors who were appointed by the current 
CEO to the total number of outside directors. [collected manually] 
Entrenchment Index Entrenchment index developed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). [Lucian 
Bebchuk’s Web] 
Economic Variables 
Market Cap Closing price for the fiscal year multiplied by the number of common 
shares outstanding of the company. [CE]  
Operating Income Change Year-to-year percentage change in operating income before depreciation. 
[CE]  
Operating Income Growth Three-year least squares annual growth rate of operating income before 
depreciation. [CE]  
ROE Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided 
by total common equity. This quotient is then multiplied by 100. [CE]  
Relative Performance Indicates whether a company outperformed or underperformed its industry 
by comparing five-year returns [BA] 
ROA Net income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations 
divided by total assets. This quotient is then multiplied by 100. [CE]  
Stock Market Return Three-year total return to shareholders, including monthly reinvestments of 
dividends. [CE]  
Stock Volatility Standard deviation volatility calculated over 60 months. [CE]  
SP Index Yearly Average Yearly average of the S&P 500 index calculated using the average of 12 
monthly averages. [Standard and Poor’s] 
Two-digit SIC Code The first two digits from the four-digit Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) Code. [CE]  
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 3  CEO Compensation and Concurrent Executive Employment of Outside Directors 23 
TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Table 2 presents summary statistics pertaining to the variables in the constructed dataset, which is a 
two-year panel dataset composed of firms with a fiscal year ending between June of 2002 and May of 
2004. We provide only pooled statistics.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Unit
Key Variables 
CEO Pay 547 6163.7 5790.9 467.6 36946.1 Thousands of dollars 
CEO Pay (Log) 547 8.3 0.9 6.1 10.5 
Director Company CEO Pay 555 7419.1 5736.8 549.1 38612.1 Thousands of dollars 
Director Company CEO Pay (Log) 555 8.6 0.8 6.3 10.6 
Ratio of CEO-Directors 537 36.2 16.4 6.3 100.0 Percentage 
Director Company Variables 
Director Company Market Cap 556 18,820.4 24,747.7 49 15,4579 Millions of dollars 
Director Company Entrenchment 533 2.6 1.0 0 6 Number 
Board and Ownership Characteristics 
Independent Directors 537 77.0 13.5 25 94 Percentage 
Busy Directors 537 10.8 12.1 0 58 Percentage 
Aged Directors 537 5.7 10.6 0 100 Percentage 
Insider Ownership 519 13.1 15.1 0 83 Percentage 
Chairman CEO 537 0.7 0.4 0 1 Dummy 
Board Size 537 10.8 2.8 5 23 Number 
CEO Tenure 537 5.4 5.3 0 41 Number 
Institution Ownership Majority 519 0.8 0.4 0 1 Dummy 
Compensation Chair Appointment 531 0.2 0.4 0 1 Dummy 
Director Appointment by CEO 514 36.0 30.0 0 100 Percentage 
Entrenchment Index 518 2.8 1.2 0 6 Number 
Economic Variables 
Market Cap 552 13,909.3 31,024.3 91 271,002 Millions of dollars 
Operating Income Change 538 13.9 377.2 –5,899 4,655 Percentage 
Operating Income Growth 523 4.5 29.2 –58 390 Percentage 
ROE 543 13.2 41.8 –314 454 Percentage
Relative Performance 518 6.5 6.5 –12 20 Percentage 
ROA 554 3.0 14.0 –207 60 Percentage
Stock Market Return 534 2.3 20.1 –76 75 Percentage 
Stock Volatility 553 0.4 0.2 0 2 Number 
SP Index Yearly Average 556 978.2 10.3 968 989 Number 
newly appointed CEOs.7 
In addition to the board and ownership characteristics, the following eight 
performance variables were devised for the test: market cap, operating income 
change, operating income growth, ROE, relative performance, ROA, stock market 
return (three-year), and stock volatility. Among them, market cap is used to reflect 
the size of the company. Operating income change, which is the year-to-year 
percentage change in operating income, represents short-term performance. 
Operating income growth, which is the three-year growth rate of operating income, 
represents long-term performance. ROE (ROA), which is net income divided by 
total common equity (total assets), represents the profitability of the firm’s 
operations. Relative performance indicates the degree to which a company 
outperformed or underperformed its industry in the stock market over the five 
previous years. These performance variables are expected to be positively 
correlated with CEO pay.  
7However, CEO tenure may also be a proxy for the CEO’s job experience. If this is the case, tenure can be 
positively correlated with the wage variable, CEO pay. 
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Finally, to represent the macroeconomic condition in each year, the variable of 
the SP index yearly average is constructed, representing the average of 12 monthly 
averages of the S&P 500 index. To reflect the industry effect (Finkelstein and 
Hambrick 1995),8 we also include the two-digit SIC code, consisting of the first 
two digits of the four-digit SIC code.9 
 
III. Methodologies 
 
In this section, we present the methodologies used for the panel data analysis. 
Primarily, we conduct the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for random 
effects (Breusch and Pagan 1980). The null hypothesis of the test is that the variance 
of the unobserved firm-specific fixed effects is zero. Because the null is rejected in 
the test for various possible specifications, we confirm that a simple pooled OLS 
estimator is not efficient. (For instance, refer to the LM test result at the bottom of 
Table 3 for regression 3.) Either the random (or the fixed) effects models or a pooled 
OLS with cluster robust standard errors would be more appropriate. 
 
A. Regression Specification for the Hypothesis 
 
First, we search for suitable regression specifications to examine the relationship 
between CEO compensation in a given company and average CEO compensation 
in the directors’ primary companies, presenting the empirical test outcomes for a 
pooled regression with cluster robust standard errors (Rogers 1993). The test 
outcomes are then compared with their alternatives — the random effects (RE) and 
the fixed effects (FE) models. We start with the following regression specification: 
 
(1) 
.
it it it it
i t t i it
CEOpay DirCEOpay B E
DI S DY c u
  
  


 
     
 
In this regression, CEOpayit is the level of CEO compensation in the given 
company (CEO pay), DirCEOpayit is the level of average CEO compensation in 
the directors’ companies (director company CEO pay), Bit is the set of the eleven 
board and ownership characteristic variables, and Eit denotes the set of the eight 
performance variables, including market cap and ROA. DIi is an industry dummy 
obtained from the two-digit SIC code, which is used to control for the industry 
fixed effect. St is the S&P 500 index yearly average, which is included to reflect the 
macroeconomic conditions for each year. 
The residuals for a given year may be correlated across different firms according 
to a concept known as “time effects” or “spatial correlation.” To handle time 
effects, year dummies (DYt) are included in the regression. On the other hand, the 
residuals for a given firm may be correlated across years, a concept referred to as  
 
8Finkelstein and Hambrick (1995) argue that CEOs are frequently compensated in relation to CEOs in the 
same industry, with the empirical finding that a 1% increase in CEO pay within an industry is associated with a 
1.37% increase in the pay of the focal CEOs in their sample. 
9The two-digit SIC code represents 83 industry categories in the United States. 
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TABLE 3—EFFECTS OF DIRECTOR COMPANY CEO PAY 
 
Table 3 presents the test results of the pooled regression with cluster robust standard errors (1–2), the 
random effects model (3), and the fixed effects model (4). The dependent variable is CEO pay. The 
key variable of interest is Director Company CEO Pay. The Breusch and Pagan LM test and 
Hausman’s specification tests are reported at the bottom. In each regression, the following economic 
variables are controlled, together with Market Cap and ROA: Operating Income Change, Operating 
Income Growth, ROE, Relative Performance, Stock Market Return, Stock Volatility, and SP Index 
Yearly Average. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: CEO Pay 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pooled OLS 
(Cluster) 
Pooled OLS 
(Cluster) 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Director Company CEO Pay 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.22*** 
 (0.0) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
Director Company Market Cap  0.003 0.002 0.020 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.040) 
Director Company Entrenchment  378.6 431.5 . 
  (292.0) (299.5) . 
Independent Directors –25.0 –17.5 –10.2 –6.2 
 (22.6) (20.8) (19.2) (28.8) 
Busy Directors 36.2*  40.9** 31.9 23.8 
 (19.7) (19.8) (19.6) (33.1) 
Aged Directors 19.8 29.9 –12.8 –94.9*** 
 (72.2) (73.2) (22.7) (35.0) 
Insider Ownership –30.6  –32.5* –25.2 –16.7 
 (18.8) (19.5) (17.8) (21.5) 
Chairman CEO 528.6 489.3 203.2 76.7 
 (430.8) (420.3) (394.0) (465.8) 
Board Size 65.5  78.1 144 189.7 
 (102.3) (106.0) (109.6) (195.8) 
CEO Tenure 17.4 39.3 80.7 347.1 
 (77.2) (76.8) (87.6) (212.0) 
Institution Ownership Majority 453.4  253.1 525.4 893.4 
 (698.1) (712.7) (597.1) (819.9) 
Compensation Chair Appointment –2,428.2*** –2,261.4*** –1,104.2 935.6 
 (797.7) (790.1) (699.5) (988.5) 
Director Appointment by CEO 13.1  13.2 0.33  –36.8 
 (12.2) (12.8) (13.6) (24.5) 
Entrenchment Index 87.3 129.6 133.0 . 
 (235.9) (249.5) (254.5) . 
Market Cap 0.082***  0.083*** 0.078***  0.0087 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.034) 
ROA –4.44 20.1 102.1*  172.7* 
 (69.5) (67.1) (58.3)  (89.6) 
Economics Variables Controlled Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 414 401 401 401 
R-squared 0.52 0.54   
Breusch and Pagan LM Test   0.00  
Hausman p-value (FE/RE)    0.0001 
Hausman p-value (FE/Pooled OLS)    0.0000 
 
 
“firm-specific effects” or “temporal correlation.” This unobserved firm-specific 
effect is denoted by ci in the given specification. Finally, uit represents the 
idiosyncratic error.  
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PANEL 1 
 
 
PANEL 2 
FIGURE 1—CHARACTERISTICS OF DIRECTORS’ PRIMARY COMPANIES 
 
Panel 1 presents a scatterplot of director company market cap versus market cap and its fitted 
line. Panel 2 presents a scatterplot of director company entrenchment versus entrenchment 
index and its fitted line. 
 
As a primary estimation, we use a pooled OLS regression with cluster robust 
standard errors. Regression 1 in Table 3 presents the test result, which shows a 
significant coefficient for the variable of interest, DirCEOpayit, where a $1.00 
increase in CEO pay at the directors’ primary companies is associated with an 
approximate $0.12 increase in CEO pay at the given firm. 
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The first concern with this initial specification is that the coefficient of the 
variable of interest DirCEOpayit may not capture the direct relationship between 
the two CEO pay variables. This concern arises out of the director selection 
procedure; large firms tend to hire outside directors from other large firms, and the 
size of director firms is strongly correlated with the level of CEO pay at the 
director firms. Panel 1 in Figure 1 indicates the potential seriousness of this 
concern: larger firms are more likely to hire directors from other larger firms. Thus, 
even without the strong direct effect of DirCEOpay on CEOpay, the coefficient for 
the variable of interest, α, could be significant in the test results. For example, 
DirCEOpay could simply be a proxy for the size of the directors’ companies. To 
control for this possible bias, we include the size variable of director firms, director 
company market cap, as a control variable, representing the average market 
capitalization of all of the matched directors’ companies.  
Similarly, the coefficient for the variable of interest DirCEOpayit may reflect the 
positive correlation between the entrenchment in the directors’ primary companies 
and that in the given company. Panel 2 in Figure 1 shows the potential seriousness 
of this concern: more strongly entrenched firms tend to hire outside directors from 
other entrenched firms. To control for this bias, we also include the entrenchment 
variable of director firms director company entrenchment as a control variable, 
representing the average entrenchment index of all of the matched directors’ 
companies.  
Thus, we arrive at the following adjusted specification, in which DirCompit 
represents a set of two additional control variables, director company market cap 
and director company entrenchment: 
 
(2)   
.
it it it it it
i t t i it
CEOpay DirCEOpay DirComp B E
DI S DY c u
   
  
  
      
 
The pooled OLS regression with the adjusted specification is displayed in the 
results for regression 2 in Table 3. This reconfirms the significant coefficient α for 
the variable of interest, DirCEOpayit, which is estimated to be 0.14. 
 
B. Alternative Econometric Models 
 
We present the test results from other alternatives — the random and the fixed 
effects models — in regressions 3 and 4, respectively. Both regressions confirm the 
significant coefficients for the variable of interest, DirCEOpayit, which are 
estimated to be 0.17 (RE) and 0.22 (FE).  
The fixed effects model generates a consistent estimate even when the firm-
specific effects are correlated with any of the independent variables. 10 
Consequently, we conduct the Hausman (1978) specification test to compare the 
fixed effects model and several alternative estimators, shown at the bottom of Table 
 
10According to Petersen’s simulations (2009), the pooled regression with cluster robust standard error 
generates a consistent estimate when the firm-specific fixed effects vary over time. However, it does not make 
sense to assume time-varying fixed effects in the given two-period sample.  
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3, for regression 4, in which the null hypothesis is that the firm-specific effect (ci) 
is not correlated with other regressors. Because the null is rejected in each test, 
both the random effects model and the pooled OLS model are biased.  
Therefore, the fixed effects estimator used in regression 4, which is identical to 
the unbiased first-difference (FD) estimator owing to the two periods in the given 
sample, solely remains consistent. According to the fixed effects estimation, we 
conclude that a reliable estimate of the coefficient for the variable of interest, α, is 
0.22. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
In this section, we summarize the test results from the previously described 
panel data analysis. Table 3 indicates the test results for the given hypothesis using 
the pooled OLS (with cluster robust standard errors) and its alternative RE/FE 
models. In all of the regressions, the coefficient for director company CEO pay is 
positive and significant at the 1% level. However, the Hausman specification test 
demonstrates the unacceptability of the pooled OLS and random effects models 
against the fixed effects model. The unbiased FE(FD) estimation in regression 4 
suggests that a $1.00 increase in CEO pay at the outside directors’ primary 
companies results in an approximate $0.22 increase in CEO pay.  
As a robustness check, we also report the elasticity estimates in Table 4 using the 
logarithm transformations of CEO pay and director company CEO pay. The three 
regressions present the elasticity of the two compensation variables in the pooled 
OLS, RE, and FE models. (The Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects and 
Hausman’s specification tests are reported at the bottom.)  
The elasticities estimated using the three different regressions are found to be 
very close to each other, at approximately 0.12~0.13. According to the unbiased 
FE(FD) estimate, it is interpreted that a 1% increase in CEO pay at the outside 
directors’ primary companies is associated with a 0.13% increase in CEO pay at a 
given firm. Except for the FE model, the coefficients of the variable of interest, 
director company CEO pay (Log), are positive and significant at the 5% level. The 
coefficient of the FE model is significant at the 10% level when using a one-sided 
test, which is acceptable in the given analysis because we conjecture that the 
negative association between the two compensation variables is unreasonable. 
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TABLE 4—ROBUSTNESS CHECK (ELASTICITY) 
 
 
Table 4 presents the test results of the pooled regressions with cluster robust standard errors 
(1), the random effects models (2), and the fixed effects models (3). The dependent variable 
is CEO pay (Log). The key variable of interest is Director Company CEO Pay (Log). The 
Breusch and Pagan LM test and Hausman’s specification tests are reported at the bottom. In 
each regression, the following economic variables are controlled together with Market Cap 
and ROA: Operating Income Change, Operating Income Growth, ROE, Relative 
Performance, Stock Market Return, Stock Volatility, and SP Index Yearly Average. 
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. [*] indicates significance at the 10% level according to a 
one-sided test.  
 
Dependent Variable: CEO Pay (Log) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS 
(Cluster) Random Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Director Company CEO Pay (Log) 0.12** 0.12** 0.13[*] 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.088) 
Director Company Market Cap 1.2E–06 1.2E–06 –3.5E–09 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Director Company Entrenchment 0.056 0.059 . 
 (0.056) (0.054) . 
Independent Directors –0.005 –0.004 –0.003 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) 
Busy Directors 0.008** 0.005 0.000 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Aged Directors –0.001 –0.005 –0.006 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) 
Insider Ownership –0.007** –0.004 –0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Chairman CEO 0.020 0.019 0.027 
 (0.075) (0.063) (0.073) 
Board Size 0.055*** 0.042** 0.0031 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.031) 
CEO Tenure –0.002 0.000 0.006 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.033) 
Institution Ownership Majority 0.180 0.220** 0.210 
 (0.140) (0.099) (0.130) 
Compensation Chair Appointment –0.390*** –0.150 0.110 
 (0.150) (0.120) (0.160) 
Director Appointment by CEO 0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Entrenchment Index 0.022 0.033 . 
 (0.046) (0.046) . 
Market Cap 8.1E–06*** 8.9E–06*** 3.4E–06 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROA 0.005 0.017* 0.029** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.014) 
Economics Variables Controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 401 401 401 
R-squared 0.46  
Breusch and Pagan LM Test  0.00 
Hausman p-value (FE/RE)   0.22 
Hausman p-value (FE/Pooled OLS)   0.00 
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V. Discussion 
 
The positive association between CEO pay at outside directors’ primary 
companies and CEO pay at a given company may stem from either 1) the direct 
positive association between the size of the director firms and that of the given 
firm, or 2) the direct positive association between the degree of entrenchment in the 
director firms and that of the given firm; larger firms tend to hire outside directors 
from other large firms and more entrenched firms tend to hire outside directors 
from other entrenched firms. However, as discussed in Section III, the positive 
effect (observed in Tables 3 and 4) of the change in CEO pay at outside directors’ 
primary companies on the change in CEO pay at a given company is not easily 
attributable to the direct positive associations between the director firms and the 
given firm because we include both director company market cap and director 
company entrenchment as control variables in the regression analysis.  
On the other hand, some may argue that the observed positive effect is 
attributable to cross-directorship, in which outside directors favor CEOs who serve 
as outside directors at their own primary companies (e.g., Hallock 1997). However, 
it is noteworthy that while reciprocal CEO interlocks exist occasionally, they are 
not very common practice in the business world as it exists today.11 In our limited 
sample of 556 firm entries, we observe only several interlocking relationships. 
Indeed, we find that removing those few entries from the sample makes little 
difference in the test outcomes. Therefore, without hesitation, we conclude that 
cross-directorship is not a major driving force behind the observed positive effect 
in the above analysis.  
Among other possible sources that may generate the observed effect, we pay 
close attention to the following two phenomena: 1) the psychological phenomenon 
known as the anchoring effect, and 2) the societal phenomenon termed the inner 
circle. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggest that individuals make estimates by 
starting from an “initial value” (anchor) that is adjusted to yield the final answer. 
Because adjustments are typically insufficient, different starting points yield 
different estimates that are biased toward the initial value. According to this theory, 
CEO compensation in outside directors’ primary companies may serve as a 
firsthand reference point for directors’ decisions on CEO pay. Once their primary 
companies pay higher CEO compensation, they are more likely to choose a higher 
value for CEO pay in a given company and to accept a CEO’s request to increase 
his or her salary. Thus, all else being equal, CEO compensation in a given firm may 
reflect the level of CEO compensation at the directors’ primary companies. This 
anchoring effect may be a primary source of the observed sensitivity between the 
change in CEO pay at the directors’ primary companies and the change in CEO pay 
at a given company. 
Top corporate executives tend to be a relatively homogeneous, cohesive 
collection of individuals, which Useem (1984) calls the inner circle.12 Outside 
directors who are top executives at other firms find it difficult to be fully objective  
 
11For instance, even in Hallock’s (1997) study, only 8% of CEOs are reciprocally interlocked. 
12The term inner circle is defined as all corporate executives who serve on the board of directors of two or 
more big corporations.  
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FIGURE 2. CEO PAY AND THE RATIO OF CEO-DIRECTORS 
 
The figure presents a scatterplot of ratio of CEO-directors versus CEO pay with its fitted line. 
 
about issues related to executive compensation. For instance, the pay consultant 
Watson Wyatt conducted a survey of two separate groups — directors and 
institutional investors — on the subject of the U.S. executive pay model.13 The 
survey reveals that the two groups have very different views of the current pay 
system; 65 percent of directors and only 22 percent of institutional investors 
believe that the stock-based pay model in the U.S. has contributed to superior 
corporate performance; 90 percent of institutional investors think that executives at 
most companies are overpaid, compared to only 60 percent of directors. This 
homogeneity of the top executives and the concurrent executive employment of 
outside directors may contribute to the observed positive association between CEO 
pay levels as far as they can stimulate implicit collusion among executives. The 
more cohesive the top executives (outside directors) are in a specific industrial 
sector (or in a specific regional market), the more closely linked CEO pay levels of 
the relevant companies are.  
As supplementary evidence to support this inner circle argument, we checked 
whether a higher number of outside directors who are active CEOs in other firms 
results in the board granting a higher level of CEO compensation. A higher number 
of CEO-directors on the board may help the CEO in a given firm propose 
suggestions that are favorable to his interests and position; CEO-directors are more 
likely to appreciate the CEO’s efforts and contributions and, thus, willingly 
increase his salary. Let the variable ratio of CEO-directors represent the ratio of 
CEO-directors to the total number of outside directors on the board (c.f., Tables 1 
and 2). At first glance, the scatterplot and the fitted line in Figure 2 imply a 
possible positive association between CEO pay and ratio of CEO-directors.  
 
13In the survey, 55 institutions managing $800 billion in assets participated, along with 50 directors. The 
survey was conducted with institutional investors in 2005 and with directors in 2006 (Watson Wyatt, 2006).  
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TABLE 5—SUPPLEMENTARY ANALYSIS (RATIO OF CEO-DIRECTORS) 
 
Table 5 presents the test results of the pooled regression with cluster robust standard errors (1), 
random effects model (2), and fixed effects model (3). The dependent variable is CEO pay. The key 
variable of interest is the ratio of CEO-directors. The Breusch and Pagan LM test and Hausman’s 
specification tests are reported at the bottom. In each regression, the following economic variables are 
controlled, together with Market Cap and ROA: Operating Income Change, Operating Income 
Growth, ROE, Relative Performance, Stock Market Return, Stock Volatility, and SP Index Yearly 
Average. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: CEO Pay 
(1) (2) (3) 
Pooled OLS 
(Cluster) 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Ratio of CEO-Directors 43.6*** 33.3*** 31.5* 
 (15.9) (12.9) (17.9) 
Independent Directors –25.0 –17.8 –3.0 
 (21.1) (19.3) (29.6) 
Busy Directors 33.5* 29.8 38.5 
 (20.2) (19.9) (34.2) 
Aged Directors 29.9 –13.3 –95.2*** 
 (69.0) (23.2) (36.4) 
Insider Ownership –27.6 –22.3 –14.1 
 (18.7) (18.0) (21.6) 
Chairman CEO 528.0 128.9 –200.4 
 (429.6) (398.5) (467.6) 
Board Size 125.6 200.1* 291.6 
 (102.7) (112.5) (200.3) 
CEO Tenure 16.0 44.1 274.5 
 (79.6) (83.8) (198.0) 
Institution Ownership Majority 453.8 689.8 929.0 
 (689.7) (610.6) (835.5) 
Compensation Chair Appointment –2350.5*** –1318.0* 687.2 
 (782.9) (695.6) (964.1) 
Director Appointment by CEO 10.5 2.7 –22.9 
 (11.9) (13.2) (22.3) 
Entrenchment Index –6.6 –2.8 . 
 (225.5) (246.4) . 
Market Cap 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.0002 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.034) 
ROA –39.0 59.9 166.3* 
 (71.3) (58.3) (89.9) 
Economics Variables Controlled Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Observation 415 415 415 
R-squared 0.53   
Breusch and Pagan LM Test  0.00  
Hausman p-value (FE/RE)   0.0001 
Hausman p-value (FE/Pooled OLS)   0.0000 
 
Table 5 reports the estimation results of the pooled OLS (with cluster robust 
standard errors), the random effects model, and the fixed effects model. According 
to the fixed effects estimation, the unbiased estimate of the coefficient for the 
variable of interest is 31.5, indicating that an increase of one percentage point in 
the ratio of outside directors who are active CEOs in other firms results in an 
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approximate $31,500 increase in CEO pay.14  
In the given sample, the average number of outside directors on the board is 9.3, 
indicating that one additional CEO-director on the board is equivalent to a 10.8% 
increase in the ratio of CEO-directors. Therefore, the replacement of a non-CEO 
outside director with a CEO-director may result in an approximate $0.34 million 
increase in CEO pay, a significant amount considering that the average CEO pay in 
the sample is approximately $6 million. This observation supports the argument 
that CEO-directors tend to view the BOD (either consciously or subconsciously) 
through the eyes of a CEO. 
There may be other valid factors influencing the observed strong link between 
CEO pay at outside directors’ primary companies and CEO pay at a given 
company. Further explorations are left for future research.15  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Since the early 1990s, many articles have been published on executive pay 
(Boyd et al. 2012). Some academic publications have focused on the optimal 
compensation contract and the pay–performance relationship when debating stock-
based pay and soaring executive pay (e.g., Jensen and Murphy 1990a, 1990b; Hall 
and Liebman 1998; Hall and Murphy 2003; Aggarwal and Samwick 1999; 
Bebchuk and Fried 2003). Others have focused on the relationship between board 
characteristics and CEO compensation, concentrating on corporate governance 
weaknesses and BOD independence (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Jensen 1993). The 
primary concern in the literature has been connected to the agency problem caused 
by the management team, or what is termed a “captured” BOD.  
However, the literature has not put much weight on the agency problem that may 
be caused purely by the BOD, including a concurrent employment issue of board 
members which may seriously affect their decision processes as related to the level 
of CEO compensation. As a complement to the “social network” literature that 
emphasizes the impact of cross-directorship on the level of CEO compensation, the 
empirical work in this paper provides a new approach to the issue of concurrent 
employment on a board. 
The unbiased fixed effects estimation confirms a strong link between CEO pay 
at outside directors’ primary companies and CEO pay in a given company, even 
after controlling for both the size (and the entrenchment) associations between the 
directors’ primary companies and the given firm. Furthermore, we find that the 
 
14We utilize the Breusch-Pagan LM test for random effects and present the test result at the bottom of Table 5 
for regression 2. Because the null is rejected, a pooled OLS estimator is not efficient. Subsequently, we conduct 
the Hausman tests to compare the fixed and random effects models and to compare the fixed effects and pooled 
OLS models. The test results at the bottom of Table 5 indicate that the nulls are rejected. Thus, both the random 
effects and the pooled OLS estimators are biased, while only the fixed effects estimator remains unbiased and 
consistent. 
15There may be a positive association between the CEO pay levels due to a CEO-director ability effect: When 
a talented CEO who is paid higher in firm A serves as an outside director in firm B, the CEO pay in firm B can be 
higher as well owing to the talented outside director’s contribution to the productivity of firm B. However, the 
observed strong link in this paper cannot be attributable to this CEO-director ability effect because we report the 
test outcomes from the first-difference (FD) panel estimations. That is, the ability of CEO-director does not vary 
across the years and thus this omitted variable does not affect the estimation outcomes.  
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number of cross-directorship relationships is very small in the sample here; thus, 
the “social network” argument does not support the observed strong link. Instead, 
we do not rule out the possibility that the link results from unintended 
psychological bias, often known as the anchoring effect. It is also plausible that the 
pay inefficiency originates from the homogeneous and cohesive collection of 
individuals (the inner circle) who serve as top executives as well as outside 
directors.  
The degrees of psychological bias and pay inefficiency will be greater when 
outside directors are more negligent or less considerate. Thus, these factors cannot 
be excuses for the violation of the directors’ duty to care. Moreover, this may 
introduce improper incentives for CEOs, as they may be tempted to recruit outside 
directors who serve for companies paying greater CEO compensation or from their 
own inner circle.   
This additional agency problem — caused by the BOD and not by the 
management team — will be difficult to control as long as concurrent executive 
employment on boards continues to exist. As suggested by some governance 
experts, including Jensen et al. (2004) and Brenner and Schwalbach (2009), this 
conflict may be alleviated through specific legal rules that make boards more 
accountable to shareholders, such as strengthening the procedural rights of 
shareholders who vote to elect directors. 
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